

PEACEKEEPING AS A FOREIGN POLICY INSTRUMENT OF EMERGING STATES

R.K.Kadyrzhanov¹, M.A.Almaz², Sh.M.Zhandossova¹

ABSTRACT

This article examines United Nations peacekeeping as an instrument of foreign policy for emerging states. It argues that peacekeeping has evolved beyond its traditional role of maintaining international peace and security and increasingly serves wider diplomatic, strategic, and institutional purposes. In contemporary international relations, participation in peacekeeping missions enables states not only to contribute to conflict management and post-conflict stabilization, but also to enhance their international visibility, strengthen their political legitimacy, and project the image of responsible actors within multilateral frameworks.

The study is based on a qualitative analysis of academic literature, policy documents, and official materials related to United Nations peacekeeping and the foreign policy practices of emerging states. Particular attention is given to Kazakhstan as the main case study, while the experiences of Turkey and Brazil are used comparatively in order to identify different models of peacekeeping engagement. The comparative analysis demonstrates that these states use peacekeeping in distinct ways depending on their strategic ambitions, institutional capacities, and domestic political contexts. Kazakhstan represents a cautious and gradual model focused on controlled international visibility, institutional learning, and the accumulation of operational experience. Turkey demonstrates a broader and more diversified approach that combines military participation with police contribution, mediation, and peacebuilding initiatives. Brazil illustrates a more leadership-oriented model, especially during its active participation in MINUSTAH, when peacekeeping became part of a more ambitious strategy of international projection.

The findings show that participation in peacekeeping missions contributes to strengthening a state's international standing, expanding diplomatic engagement, and enhancing institutional and military capacities. The study concludes that peacekeeping functions as an important but differentiated foreign policy instrument for emerging states, the political meaning and practical effectiveness of which depend on both international recognition and domestic capacity.

Keywords: United Nations peacekeeping, emerging states, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Brazil, Foreign Policy, International Security Governance, Middle Power Diplomacy.

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Citation:

Kadyrzhanov R.K., Almaz M.A., Zhandossova Sh. M. Peacekeeping as a foreign policy instrument of emerging states // Adam Alemi. – 2026. – Vol. 28. – No. 3 (109). – P. 151–161.
– DOI: 10.48010/zmw0jp30

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Received: 26/05/2026

Accepted: 25/08/2026

Published online: 30/09/2026

Бітімгершілік дамушы мемлекеттердің сыртқы саясатының құралы ретінде

Аңдатпа. Бұл мақалада Біріккен Ұлттар Ұйымының бітімгерлік қызметі дамушы мемлекеттердің сыртқы саясатының құралы ретінде қарастырылады. Автор қазіргі халықаралық қатынастар жағдайында бітімгерліктің тек халықаралық бейбітшілік пен қауіпсіздікті қамтамасыз ету функциясымен шектелмейтінін, керісінше оның дипломатиялық, стратегиялық және институционалдық маңызы артып келе жатқанын негіздейді. Бітімгерлік миссияларға қатысу мемлекеттерге тек қақтығыстарды реттеу мен жанжалдан кейінгі тұрақтандыруға үлес қосуға ғана емес, сонымен қатар халықаралық беделін нығайтуға, дипломатиялық байланыстарын кеңейтуге, саяси легитимдігін арттыруға және көпжақты жүйедегі жауапты актор ретіндегі бейнесін қалыптастыруға мүмкіндік береді. Осы тұрғыдан алғанда, бітімгерлікті тек қауіпсіздік практикасы ретінде емес, сыртқы саясаттың көпқырлы құралы ретінде түсіну қажет.

Зерттеу БҰҰ бітімгерлік операцияларына қатысуға қатысты ғылыми әдебиеттерді, саяси құжаттарды және ресми материалдарды сапалық талдауға негізделген. Негізгі назар Қазақстан тәжірибесіне аударылған, ал Түркия мен Бразилияның тәжірибесі салыстырмалы талдау үшін пайдаланылған. Салыстырмалы талдау бұл мемлекеттердің бітімгерлікті өздерінің сыртқы саяси мақсаттарына әртүрлі деңгейде және әртүрлі үлгіде енгізетінін көрсетеді. Бұл айырмашылықтар олардың стратегиялық ұмтылыстарына, институционалдық әлеуетіне және ішкі саяси жағдайына байланысты. Қазақстан біртіндеп және сақтықпен дамып келе жатқан

үлгіні көрсетеді, мұнда басты назар институционалдық дамуға, операциялық тәжірибе жинақтауға және халықаралық аренадағы салмақты, бірақ шектеулі көрінуге аударылады. Түркия әскери қатысуды полиция компонентімен, бейбітшілікке және бейбітшілікке орнықтыру бастамаларымен ұштастыратын анағұрлым кеңейтілген үлгіні көрсетеді. Бразилия болса, әсіресе MINUSTAH миссиясы кезеңінде, бітімгерлікті халықаралық деңгейде танылу мен ықпалын күшейтудің құралы ретінде пайдаланған неғұрлым белсенді модельді танытады.

Зерттеу нәтижелері бітімгерлік миссияларға қатысу мемлекеттің халықаралық позициясын нығайтуға, дипломатиялық белсенділігін кеңейтуге, сондай-ақ институционалдық және әскери әлеуетін арттыруға ықпал ететінін көрсетеді. Сонымен қатар, мақалада мұндай қатысудың шектеулері де анықталады: ресурстық тапшылық, ведомствоаралық үйлестіру мәселелері, ішкі саяси өзгерістердің әсері және қазіргі бітімгерлік операциялардың күрделене түсуі. Қорытындысында бітімгерлік дамушы мемлекеттер үшін маңызды, бірақ бірқалып емес сыртқы саяси құрал ретінде бағаланады; оның тиімділігі халықаралық мойындауға да, мемлекеттің ішкі мүмкіндіктеріне де тәуелді.

Түйін сөздер: БҰҰ бітімгершілік операциялары, дамушы мемлекеттер, Қазақстан, Түркия, Бразилия, сыртқы саясат, халықаралық қауіпсіздік, орта державалар дипломатиясы.

Миротворчество как инструмент внешней политики развивающихся государств

Аннотация. В статье рассматривается миротворческая деятельность Организации Объединённых Наций как инструмент внешней политики развивающихся государств. Обосновывается, что в современных международных отношениях миротворчество уже не ограничивается своей традиционной функцией поддержания международного мира и безопасности, а всё в большей степени приобретает дипломатическое, стратегическое и институциональное значение. Участие государств в миротворческих миссиях позволяет им не только вносить вклад в урегулирование конфликтов и постконфликтную стабилизацию, но и укреплять международные позиции, расширять дипломатическое присутствие, повышать политическую легитимность и формировать образ ответственных участников многостороннего взаимодействия. В этом смысле миротворчество следует рассматривать не только как практику международной безопасности, но и как многомерный инструмент внешней политики.

Исследование основано на качественном анализе научной литературы, политических документов и официальных материалов, посвящённых участию государств в операциях ООН по поддержанию мира. Основное внимание уделено Казахстану, тогда как опыт Турции и Бразилии используется в сравнительном плане для выявления различных моделей использования миротворчества во внешнеполитических целях. Сравнительный анализ показывает, что данные государства по-разному интегрируют миротворческую деятельность в свои внешнеполитические стратегии в зависимости от уровня институционального развития, стратегических амбиций и внутреннего политического контекста. Казахстан представляет осторожную и постепенную модель участия, ориентированную на институциональное развитие, накопление профессионального опыта и выверенную международную видимость. Турция демонстрирует более диверсифицированный подход, сочетающий военное участие, полицейский компонент, посредничество и элементы миростроительства. Бразилия, в свою очередь, представляет более амбициозную модель, особенно в период участия в миссии MINUSTAH, когда миротворчество стало частью её стратегии международного позиционирования.

Результаты исследования показывают, что участие в миротворческих миссиях способствует укреплению международного статуса государства, расширению дипломатического взаимодействия, а также развитию институционального и военного потенциала. Вместе с тем выявляются и существенные ограничения: дефицит ресурсов, проблемы межведомственной координации, влияние внутренних политических изменений и растущая многомерность современных миротворческих операций. Делается вывод о том, что миротворчество выступает важным, но неоднородным инструментом внешней политики развивающихся государств, эффективность которого определяется как международным признанием, так и внутренними возможностями государства.

Ключевые слова: миротворческие операции ООН, развивающиеся государства, Казахстан, Турция, Бразилия, внешняя политика, международная безопасность, дипломатия средних держав.

Introduction

In contemporary international relations, United Nations peacekeeping operations have remained as one of the key mechanisms for maintaining international stability. However, it is important to note that the role of peacekeeping has significantly evolved over time. Today, it extends beyond conflict management and post-conflict stabilization; it increasingly embodies the wider political and strategic objectives of the participating states.

Recent scholarship increasingly suggests that peacekeeping should not be regarded

solely as a means of promoting international peace and security. Meiske and Ruggeri argue that, over the past few decades, peacekeeping has gained both significance and complexity, becoming more influenced by the foreign and security policy priorities of individual states[1]. This argument is also supported by Neack, who emphasizes that participation in peacekeeping missions may reflect not only commitment to international peace and security, but also national interests, including international status, visibility, and influence within the international system. In this view, peacekeeping can contribute to various objectives, such as enhancing

national status, increasing influence within the international system, reducing conflict spill-over, managing refugee flows, and stabilizing political and economic relations. Therefore, peacekeeping should be understood not only as a multilateral security practice but also as a distinct foreign policy tool available to states.

In this regard, growing attention should be paid to the role of emerging states in peacekeeping missions. In recent decades, a number of such states have expanded their participation in UN operations. This trend cannot be explained solely by security considerations. It is obvious that participation in peacekeeping is closely linked to foreign policy strategies aimed at strengthening international position, increasing visibility, and expanding diplomatic engagement.

Thus, peacekeeping can be viewed not only as a security instrument, but also as a practical tool of foreign policy. Through participation in international missions, states demonstrate their commitment to multilateral cooperation and seek to position themselves as responsible actors in the international system. At the same time, such engagement contributes to the development of institutional capacities and professional experience. Recent research also suggests that peacekeeping may serve not only as a foreign policy tool in a broad sense, but also as a mechanism of status-seeking and identity-building. Dobrescu argues that states may use peacekeeping contributions in order to acquire a positive social identity in the international arena through association with highly ranked and legitimate international practices. In this perspective, peacekeeping becomes attractive not only because it contributes to security, but also because it can generate reputational gains, recognition, and international legitimacy [2].

Kazakhstan represents an illustrative example of this process. Since gaining independence, the country has gradually increased its involvement in international peacekeeping activities and developed the necessary institutional framework for such participation. At the same time, Kazakhstan's engagement reflects not only security considerations but also broader aspirations related to its international positioning and foreign policy orientation [3].

The experience of other states also confirms this trend. Countries such as Turkey and Brazil have actively used participation in peacekeeping missions as part of their broad-

er foreign policy strategies, combining military involvement with diplomatic and political objectives. Brazil offers an important comparative example. Although it had participated in peace operations for decades, its role changed significantly after 2004, when it assumed the military command of MINUSTAH in Haiti [4]. This marked a shift from selective contributions to a more visible and politically ambitious peacekeeping profile. Turkey provides a particularly useful comparative case. Although it first participated in international operations during the Korean War in 1950–1953, when it deployed approximately 15,000 personnel over the course of the conflict, the country remained largely distant from peace support operations for decades. Its profile changed after the Cold War, when Turkey began to participate more actively in operations from Bosnia and Kosovo to Afghanistan, Palestine, East Timor, and Georgia. This indicates that peacekeeping has become an important element of international engagement for a wide range of actors [5].

Despite the growing literature on UN peacekeeping, limited attention has been paid to how emerging states use peacekeeping as a foreign policy instrument in different ways and under different domestic and regional conditions, particularly in comparative perspective and with reference to Central Asia. This article addresses that gap by examining how peacekeeping participation functions as a tool of foreign policy among emerging states, with particular attention to Kazakhstan and comparative reference to Turkey and Brazil. It argues that peacekeeping serves as a differentiated foreign policy instrument whose form and effectiveness depend on strategic ambition, institutional development, and the broader political context in which participation takes place [2].

Methodology

This study is based on a qualitative comparative analysis that consists of scientific literature, policy documents, and official materials related to United Nations peacekeeping operations and the foreign policy practices of emerging states. The article focuses primarily on the case of Kazakhstan, while using Turkey and Brazil as comparative cases to identify similarities and differences in the ways peacekeeping is used as an instrument of foreign policy. These cases differ in terms of geographic location, scale of participation,

and foreign policy traditions, yet all represent emerging states that have used peacekeeping within their international engagement strategies. This variation allows for the identification of both common patterns and context-specific differences in the use of peacekeeping as a foreign policy instrument.

To ensure analytical consistency, the study operationalizes "peacekeeping as a foreign policy instrument" through a set of qualitative indicators. These include the extent of military and police participation, the degree of integration of peacekeeping into broader diplomatic and strategic initiatives, involvement in mediation or peacebuilding activities, institutional development related to peacekeeping (such as training centers and specialized units), and the level of international visibility, including mission leadership or high-profile contributions. These indicators are not treated as quantitative measures, but as analytical categories that allow for structured comparison across cases.

The study's purpose is to identify the main political and institutional patterns that explain why and how emerging states use peacekeeping in their foreign policy practice.

The limitation of the study is that it relies mainly on open sources and official materials, which do not always fully reflect internal political decision-making. Nevertheless, this approach makes it possible to reveal the main trends and characteristic features of peacekeeping participation in the foreign policy strategies of emerging states.

Main part

Peacekeeping as a foreign policy instrument

Participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions has increasingly become an important element of foreign policy for many states. It is important to note that peacekeeping today is not limited only to maintain international security. In recent years, it has also acquired clear political and diplomatic significance. In contemporary international relations, peacekeeping increasingly functions as an instrument of foreign policy, especially for emerging states seeking to strengthen their international position and expand their diplomatic presence. This is important because peacekeeping allows states not only to support multilateral efforts, but also to demon-

strate responsibility, gain visibility, and shape their image within the international system. Kazakhstan's own trajectory already reflects this logic, as peacekeeping has gradually become part of its broader strategy of international engagement.

The experience of Turkey and Brazil confirms that this is a broader pattern rather than an isolated case. Turkey's first major external military experience dates back to the Korean War of 1950–1953, when it deployed 15,000 personnel. After remaining largely distant from peace support operations for decades, Turkey became much more active after the Cold War, participating in missions from Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan to Palestine, East Timor, and Georgia. By August 2006, Turkey was involved in 9 of 18 ongoing UN operations and deployed 170 personnel, including 162 police officers, which already showed that its participation was not limited to military contingents [5].

Turkey's contribution also reveals that peacekeeping can be embedded in a wider foreign policy toolkit. Research on Turkish peacebuilding shows that the country gradually connected peace operations with mediation, humanitarian diplomacy, and development assistance. The establishment of TIKA in 1992, the launch of the Alliance of Civilizations in 2005, and the creation of the Group of Friends of Mediation with Finland in 2010 demonstrate that Turkey sought to combine security engagement with soft power instruments. This means that peacekeeping was not treated as an isolated activity, but as part of a broader strategy of international activism [6].

Brazil followed a different but equally important path. Its peacekeeping profile changed gradually after 2004, when for the first time in its history it commanded UN multinational troops in Haiti through MINUSTAH. During the governments of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, peacekeeping became linked to a more assertive foreign policy, broader engagement with the Global South, and Brazil's aspiration to be recognized as an emerging power with greater international influence. Brazilian participation in peace operations increased rapidly in this period and reached its peak in 2012, when more than 2,000 Brazilians were serving in UN missions. In this sense, peacekeeping was used not only for operational purposes, but also for international projection [7].

Kazakhstan's trajectory fits into this broader pattern, although in a more cautious and incre-

mental way. Since independence, Kazakhstan has gradually integrated peacekeeping into its broader strategy of international engagement. Its participation reflects not only concern for international security, but also an effort to strengthen institutional capacities, enhance diplomatic profile, and support its role as a responsible actor in multilateral affairs. However, peacekeeping does not generate foreign policy value automatically. As recent research suggests, its status and diplomatic effects depend not only on participation itself, but also on whether such participation is recognized by relevant international audiences as legitimate and meaningful.

Thus, the cases of Kazakhstan, Turkey, and Brazil show that peacekeeping serves broader political functions. It provides international visibility, strengthens multilateral engagement, and helps emerging states present themselves as responsible actors. The scale and form of participation may differ, but in all three cases peacekeeping increasingly operates as an instrument of foreign policy rather than as a narrowly military practice alone.

Kazakhstan's model of peacekeeping participation and institutional development

Kazakhstan represents a cautious and selective model of peacekeeping participation among emerging states. Unlike Brazil, which used MINUSTAH for high-profile international projection, or Turkey, which combined peacekeeping with policing, mediation, and development diplomacy, Kazakhstan has relied on a lower-profile but gradually expanding form of engagement. Its importance lies less in the scale of deployment than in the way peacekeeping has been used to build controlled international visibility, operational experience, and institutional credibility [8].

Kazakhstan's peacekeeping trajectory developed incrementally after independence in 1991. An early step was participation in CENTRASBAT, which familiarized Kazakhstan with multinational military cooperation in the Central Asian regional context. A more substantial stage followed with the establishment of KAZBAT in the early 2000s, which created a more structured institutional basis for peacekeeping preparation and allowed Kazakhstan to gradually integrate into international peacekeeping structures [8].

Kazakhstan's first significant overseas operational experience came in Iraq between 2003 and 2008. During the operation, Kazakh military engineers were engaged in demining operations, disposal of unexploded ordnance, and assistance to civilians. According to earlier studies, Kazakh military engineers destroyed thousands of explosive devices during this period, making Iraq a formative stage in the country's operational learning. This experience strengthened Kazakhstan's peacekeeping capabilities and enhanced its image as a responsible participant in international security initiatives [9].

The significance of this stage was not only technical. Iraq demonstrated that Kazakhstan was prepared to contribute to international stabilization efforts beyond its immediate region, while also giving its armed forces their first substantial peacekeeping-related field experience. A later important step was Kazakhstan's participation in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which gave Kazakhstan direct visibility within the UN peacekeeping framework and increased its exposure to international standards, mission procedures, and multinational coordination practices [10]. In this sense, UNIFIL mattered not because of the scale of deployment alone, but because it inserted Kazakhstan more clearly into the symbolic and institutional space of UN peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping has also contributed to Kazakhstan's military-professional and institutional development. The creation of specialized peacekeeping units, training programs, and preparation mechanisms helped Kazakhstan improve the professional training of its armed forces and align them more closely with international requirements. Participation in external missions supported operational readiness, strengthened coordination skills, and encouraged adaptation to international standards. Thus, for Kazakhstan, peacekeeping has functioned not only as an external activity, but also as a mechanism of internal professionalization and institutional consolidation [11].

Recent UN statistics also suggest that Kazakhstan's contribution, although still limited in absolute terms, has become more visible in recent years, indicating a shift from symbolic participation toward more tangible engagement [12].

At the same time, Kazakhstan's peacekeeping model remains constrained by scale,

resources, and institutional capacity. Its participation is still modest in comparison with major troop contributors, and this limitation remains one of the defining features of its profile. Yet this modesty is also part of the logic of Kazakhstan's foreign policy. Rather than pursuing large-scale status activism, the country has used peacekeeping in a measured and strategically cautious way. This makes Kazakhstan an example of how an emerging state can employ peacekeeping not through quantitative prominence, but through gradual, institutionally meaningful, and politically calibrated participation [10; 3].

In comparative terms, Kazakhstan therefore represents a model of peacekeeping based on gradualism, institutional learning, and measured international visibility. Its importance lies less in numerical contribution than in the steady accumulation of operational experience, diplomatic legitimacy, and professional capacity. This makes Kazakhstan a relevant case for understanding how emerging states can use peacekeeping in a cautious but politically meaningful way [3].

Thus, peacekeeping should be understood not only as an external activity, but also as a mechanism for internal professionalization and institutional development. The experience of different states confirms that peacekeeping serves as an important mechanism of military and institutional development. It reflects a process through which states strengthen their military capacities, improve institutional coordination, and adapt to the requirements of modern international security.

Comparative perspectives: Turkey and Brazil

Turkey and Brazil provide two distinct but highly relevant models of how emerging states use peacekeeping as an instrument of foreign policy. In both cases, participation in peace operations went beyond narrow security considerations and became linked to broader international ambitions. At the same time, the two trajectories differ in scale, institutional form, and political sustainability.

Turkey's peacekeeping profile reflects both continuity and transformation. Its first major external military experience dates to the Korean War of 1950–1953, when it deployed a total of 15,000 personnel. After remaining largely distant from peace support operations for

nearly half a century, Turkey expanded its role significantly after the Cold War [5]. It participated in missions ranging from Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan to Palestine, East Timor, and Georgia. According to Koçer, by mid-2006 Turkey was taking part in 9 of 18 ongoing UN peace support operations and had deployed 170 personnel, including 162 police officers, which placed it 47th among peace support contributors at that time. This is particularly important because it shows that Turkey's participation was not limited to military contingents and already had a strong policing dimension [5].

This multidimensional profile became even more visible in the 2000s and 2010s. Research on Turkey's contribution to international policing shows that, as of April 2020, Turkey ranked 26th out of 77 states contributing police personnel to UN peacekeeping missions. Unlike its more geographically selective military presence, Turkish police personnel were spread across several missions in Africa and the Middle East. The same research argues that this expansion was linked not only to global changes in peacekeeping, but also to domestic political transformation, especially the decline of military tutelage and the stronger role of civilian decision-makers in foreign policy. In this sense, Turkey adapted relatively early to the multidimensional nature of post-Cold War peace operations [14].

Turkey also used peacekeeping as part of a broader diplomatic and peacebuilding strategy. The establishment of TIKA in 1992 provided an institutional basis for Turkish soft power through economic, humanitarian, and cultural cooperation. Later, Turkey launched the Alliance of Civilizations in 2005 together with Spain and co-created the Group of Friends of Mediation with Finland in 2010. These initiatives demonstrate that Turkey linked peace support operations with mediation, humanitarian diplomacy, and development-oriented engagement [6]. Therefore, peacekeeping in the Turkish case should be understood not as an isolated military activity, but as one component of a wider foreign policy toolkit.

Brazil presents a different model, one much more strongly associated with mission leadership and international projection through a single major case. Although Brazil had participated in UN peace operations earlier, a decisive turning point came in 2004, when for the first time in its history it commanded UN multi-

national troops in Haiti under MINUSTAH. This was not only an operational milestone, but also a political one. Brazilian peacekeeping became linked to a more assertive foreign policy under Lula da Silva, stronger engagement with the Global South, and the aspiration to be recognized as a relevant actor in global governance. The size of Brazil's contribution expanded rapidly, increasing from 82 personnel in 2003 to 1,367 in 2004, and reaching a peak of 2,493 in 2011 [7].

The Brazilian experience in Haiti was also significant because of its scale and multidimensional character. Over thirteen years of presence in MINUSTAH, Brazil contributed around 37,000 military and police personnel, which amounted to approximately 69 percent of all personnel ever sent by the country to foreign missions. Brazilian involvement extended beyond military deployment to activities related to pacification, police training, infrastructure recovery, humanitarian assistance, and development-oriented practices. This made MINUSTAH not simply a peacekeeping mission, but a platform through which Brazil projected a broader defence–security–foreign policy nexus [14].

At the same time, Brazil also illustrates the fragility of peacekeeping-based prominence.

After the termination of MINUSTAH in 2017, the country's peacekeeping profile declined sharply. By 2024, only 81 Brazilians remained in active UN peacekeeping operations worldwide. Recent scholarship therefore suggests that while peacekeeping gave Brazil international visibility and leadership experience, these gains proved difficult to sustain once domestic political priorities shifted and the country became more cautious about empowering its military establishment through international missions [14].

In comparative terms, Turkey and Brazil represent two different pathways through which emerging states may use peacekeeping for foreign policy purposes. Turkey demonstrates a broader and more diversified model, combining military deployment, policing, mediation, and peacebuilding. Brazil represents a more concentrated but more visible model, centered on mission leadership and multidimensional peacekeeping during the MINUSTAH period. Together with Kazakhstan's more cautious and gradual trajectory, these cases show that peacekeeping can serve as a differentiated foreign policy instrument whose meaning depends on each state's strategic ambitions, institutional capacities, and domestic political conditions.

Table 1. Dominant forms of peacekeeping engagement of Kazakhstan, Turkey, and Brazil

Country	Military deployment	Police contribution	Mediation	Institutional development	Mission leadership	Peacebuilding / development aid
Kazakhstan	3	0	0	3	1	1
Turkey	3	3	3	2	1	3
Brazil	3	1	1	2	3	3

Note: The table is based on the authors' analytical coding of the literature. The scores within 0-3 reflect dominant patterns of participation rather than official UN quantitative statistics.

Table 1 demonstrates that Kazakhstan, Turkey, and Brazil differ not only in the scale of participation, but also in the dominant forms of peacekeeping engagement. Kazakhstan's profile is concentrated in military deployment and institutional development, which reflects its gradual and cautious approach. Turkey presents a broader pattern, combining military, police, mediation, and peacebuilding elements within a more proactive foreign policy framework. Brazil, in turn, stands out

for mission leadership and its stronger association with multidimensional peacekeeping, especially during the MINUSTAH period. Thus, peacekeeping functions as a differentiated foreign policy instrument rather than a uniform practice among emerging states.

Constraints and structural limitations

Despite the growing role of peacekeeping as an instrument of foreign policy, participa-

tion of emerging states remains constrained by a number of structural factors. It is important to note that involvement in international missions depends not only on political willingness, but also on institutional capacity, financial resources, available personnel, and the broader strategic priorities of the state. In this sense, peacekeeping is always shaped by both ambition and limitation [15].

One of the main constraints is the question of resource capacity. Participation in international missions requires training, transport, logistical support, and the ability to sustain personnel abroad. For countries such as Kazakhstan, this often means a gradual and cautious approach. Kazakhstan's participation has expanded step by step, but its scale remains limited in comparison with larger contributors. This is not only a reflection of foreign policy choice, but also of capacity. Peacekeeping requires long-term institutional investment, and this process cannot be accelerated easily [8].

The Turkish case demonstrates that even states with broader international engagement face important internal limitations. Research on Turkish international policing shows that the country's growing role in UN-led missions since the 2000s was shaped not only by international trends, but also by domestic political change, especially the decline of military tutelage and the rise of civilian influence in foreign policy decision-making. This means that participation in peacekeeping is not simply a matter of sending troops or police abroad; it also depends on how domestic institutions are organized and who controls foreign policy priorities. In this regard, peacekeeping becomes sensitive to changes in state structure and internal political balance [5].

Brazil's experience reveals another type of constraint: the difficulty of sustaining international visibility over time. The country's leadership role in MINUSTAH provided it with significant international recognition, but this prominence proved difficult to maintain once domestic political and economic conditions changed. The decline in Brazil's peacekeeping participation after 2017 indicates that peacekeeping-based status is contingent upon long-term political commitment [7].

Another important constraint is the multi-dimensional character of contemporary peacekeeping operations. Modern missions require not only military capabilities, but also police, administrative, and coordination capacities.

This places additional demands on emerging states and affects their ability to adapt to evolving peacekeeping mandates. Turkey's expansion into police contributions and mediation reflects such adaptation, while Kazakhstan is still developing these capacities [6; 13].

Also, institutional coordination is another important challenge. Peacekeeping participation requires effective cooperation between defense institutions, foreign ministries, training centers, and sometimes police structures. Where such coordination remains weak or fragmented, the state may struggle to transform participation into a sustainable foreign policy tool. This is particularly relevant for emerging states because they often seek to combine international visibility with limited institutional resources. Thus, the effectiveness of peacekeeping participation depends not only on the number of personnel deployed, but also on the state's ability to integrate military, diplomatic, and administrative mechanisms.

Finally, peacekeeping participation is constrained by the need to balance international commitments with domestic and regional priorities. These cases demonstrate that peacekeeping is never fully autonomous as a policy tool and remains embedded within broader national strategies and political trade-offs [7].

Thus, the experience of Kazakhstan, Turkey, and Brazil demonstrates that peacekeeping participation is shaped not only by foreign policy aspirations, but also by structural and institutional constraints. Emerging states may use peacekeeping to strengthen international positioning, but the scale, continuity, and impact of such participation depend on resources, coordination, domestic politics, and the evolving demands of modern peace operations.

Discussions

The analysis shows that UN peacekeeping has become more than a technical instrument of international security, it has evolved into a multifunctional instrument of foreign policy rather than a purely security-oriented activity. This finding is consistent with earlier research showing that peacekeeping participation may reflect not only commitment to the international community, but also the self-interested goals of states, including status, influence, and international visibility [15]. For emerging states, it increasingly functions as a tool of foreign policy, international positioning, and

institutional development [16]. From a political perspective, peacekeeping participation can be interpreted as a form of international signalling. By contributing personnel, training capacity, or mission leadership, emerging states communicate their willingness to act as responsible members of the international community. This signal is particularly important for states that seek greater recognition but do not possess the material capabilities of major powers. In this sense, peacekeeping allows such states to transform limited material contribution into broader political visibility and diplomatic legitimacy [2; 15].

In line with the literature on middle powers, such engagement may also reflect attempts to exercise influence through multilateral institutions and cooperative international practices [2]. In this regard, the cases of Kazakhstan, Turkey, and Brazil demonstrate that participation in peacekeeping missions reflects not only security concerns, but also wider diplomatic ambitions and domestic political dynamics.

At the same time, the comparison demonstrates that peacekeeping does not produce a uniform political outcome across cases. Instead, its foreign policy value depends on how participation is embedded in broader national strategies. Instead, peacekeeping functions as a differentiated foreign policy instrument, shaped by each country's strategic ambitions, institutional capacities, and domestic political context. Kazakhstan represents a cautious and incremental model based on controlled visibility and gradual institutional learning [3]. Kazakhstan's cautious model should also be understood politically [17]. Since it is located between major regional powers and committed to a multivector foreign policy, Kazakhstan uses peacekeeping as a low-risk form of international activism [3]. It allows the country to demonstrate commitment to global security without creating the impression of geopolitical alignment or military overextension. Therefore, the limited scale of Kazakhstan's participation is not only a capacity issue, but also a political choice shaped by the need to balance international visibility with regional caution. The Kazakhstani case also confirms that limited participation does not necessarily mean weak political relevance. According to the International Peace Institute's country profile, Kazakhstan only began contributing personnel to UN peacekeeping operations in 2007, and for the following decade its contributions remained minimal, consisting mainly

of experts and police officers [18]. The same profile notes that Astana's cautious approach was partly shaped by the deaths of several Kazakhstani troops in Tajikistan in the 1990s, while participation in relatively low-risk UN missions offered Kazakhstan's military an opportunity to gain operational experience and take part in prestigious international activities [18]. Turkey demonstrates a more diversified approach that integrates military participation with policing, mediation, and peacebuilding initiatives. Brazil, in turn, illustrates a leadership-oriented model, in which peacekeeping became a platform for international projection, particularly during the MINUSTAH period [8].

These differences suggest that the political meaning of peacekeeping participation varies significantly across cases. In Turkey's case, peacekeeping is embedded within a broader foreign policy framework that combines hard and soft power instruments. In Brazil, it served as a mechanism for enhancing global visibility and strengthening claims to a more prominent role in international governance. In Kazakhstan, participation is more closely associated with institutional development and the consolidation of a responsible international image. Thus, peacekeeping does not carry a uniform strategic function; rather, it adapts to the foreign policy priorities and strategic cultures of individual states [6].

The three cases also demonstrate different political uses of peacekeeping. Kazakhstan uses peacekeeping as a cautious instrument of multivector diplomacy and controlled international visibility. Turkey uses it as part of a broader activist foreign policy, combining peacekeeping with policing, mediation, humanitarian diplomacy, and institutional outreach. Brazil used peacekeeping more directly as a platform for leadership and status projection, especially during the MINUSTAH period. Thus, the difference between the three cases is not only operational, but political: each state uses peacekeeping to communicate a different image of its role in international order.

An important implication of this analysis is that peacekeeping does not automatically translate into increased international status or influence. As recent studies suggest, status in international relations is relational and depends on recognition by relevant actors. Therefore, the effectiveness of peacekeeping as a foreign policy tool depends not only on participation itself, but also on how such participation is perceived and interpreted by the

international community. This adds an important layer of complexity, particularly for emerging states seeking to use peacekeeping as a means of enhancing their global standing [19].

Moreover, the findings highlight the importance of the multidimensional nature of contemporary peacekeeping operations. Modern missions require not only military contributions, but also police personnel, administrative expertise, and coordination mechanisms [20]. This reflects the broader evolution of peacekeeping toward complex, multidimensional operations involving political, civilian, and institutional components. States that can adapt to these multidimensional requirements such as Turkey tend to develop more diversified forms of participation. In contrast, states that are still building such capacities such as Kazakhstan tend to follow a more gradual and selective trajectory. Brazil's experience demonstrates that even states with advanced capabilities may face challenges in sustaining multidimensional engagement over time.

Overall, the analysis suggests that peacekeeping should be understood as a flexible but constrained foreign policy instrument. While it offers emerging states opportunities for international engagement, visibility, and institutional development, its effectiveness depends on a combination of factors, including resources, institutional coordination, domestic political stability, and international recognition. Therefore, peacekeeping is best understood not as a uniform practice, but as a context-dependent tool whose meaning and impact vary across different national settings.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it should be emphasized that participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions can no longer be understood solely as a security activity. In the contemporary international system, peacekeeping increasingly functions as an instrument of foreign policy through which emerging states seek to strengthen their international position, expand diplomatic engagement, and demonstrate their relevance in multilateral affairs. The cases of Kazakhstan, Turkey, and Brazil clearly confirm this trend, although each of them follows a different trajectory and uses peacekeeping in a different way.

The analysis has shown that Kazakhstan represents a gradual and cautious model of

participation. Its trajectory developed step by step, from early regional cooperation after independence to operational experience in Iraq and later involvement in UN peacekeeping through UNIFIL. Turkey, by contrast, demonstrates a broader and more diversified model that combines military contribution with police participation, mediation efforts, and development-oriented engagement. Brazil illustrates a more ambitious pattern, especially during the MINUSTAH period, when peacekeeping became closely linked to its search for greater international recognition and a stronger position in global governance. Thus, peacekeeping serves different political functions depending on the strategic culture, institutional capacities, and foreign policy priorities of each state.

At the same time, the study has demonstrated that peacekeeping participation is shaped not only by international ambitions, but also by structural constraints. Resources, institutional coordination, domestic political dynamics, and the changing multidimensional character of peace operations all influence the scale and continuity of engagement. In this regard, peacekeeping should be seen as a complex and evolving practice that combines elements of security, diplomacy, institutional learning, and international positioning. Overall, the comparison suggests that peacekeeping has become an important but differentiated instrument of foreign policy for emerging states, and its significance lies not only in troop deployment, but also in the broader political meaning attached to international participation.

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R.K. Kadyrzhanov - conceptualization, methodology, supervision, and critical revision of the manuscript. M.A. Almaz - literature review, analysis, and drafting of the manuscript. Sh.M. Zhandosova - interpretation of results, and editing of the manuscript.

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