DOI:
Keywords
Historicism, Hermeneutics, Methodology, Epistemology, Contemporary Philosophy, Social Science, Natural Science
In this article, we are trying to grasp the role of hisroricism in the understanding of epistemology in the late of XX century. From Bacon to enlightenment, it has been understood that the only criterion of science based on natural sciences. The extent of science has also been determined as study according to the method of the natural sciences, therefore the sciences concerned with history and society has also determined according to method of the natural sciences. In this article authors aims to introduce to movement called Historicism. Which is emerged in XIX century as a critical viewpoint against classical approach to the science. Most influential figure of this movement was German thinker Wilhelm Dilthey. Dilthey had an anti-positivist attitude towards the established methodology by natural science. Which was saying that in order to be a science every researcher must have rigorous set of rules and their research must based on experiment results, observable facts, and objective evidence. Starting from Dilthey and with help of other philosophical schools new movement called historicism starts its journey to establishing new methodology to human and social science. And this movement made a classification of science. They divided science into natural and spiritual science. Each of science has its own methods and object of study. They believed that to social and human study we cannot apply natural science methods of research due to it is not a physical or biological subject but it is social life and human destiny and history. Considering this process of change, is it possible to talk about historicism as a contemporary epistemological approach? As a methodology, can we talk about history in the separation of positive science? What is the subject of history in social and human sciences? By moving from this questions, we will try to understand the role of historicism in the contemprory philosophy on the hermeneutical phenomenological approach.