Parliament in the Context of Political Reforms: A Mechanism for Supporting Civic Participation and Institutionalizing Interest Group
DOI:
10.48010/zxbjs569Keywords
Parliament, Kurultai, Constitutional Commission, Electoral System, Mixed System, Proportional System, Lobbying, Interest Groups, Checks And Balances
Abstract
This article examines the relationship between the evolution of electoral systems and the effectiveness of the Mazhilis of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the context of ongoing constitutional reforms. The study provides a comparative analysis of parliamentary activity across different convocations formed under majoritarian, mixed, and proportional electoral systems. The empirical basis of the research includes data on the number of parliamentary inquiries, legislative initiatives, and the use of parliamentary oversight mechanisms.
The findings demonstrate that the formal design of an electoral system does not automatically ensure parliamentary effectiveness. Instead, parliamentary performance largely depends on the degree of institutional independence from the executive branch, the capacity to ensure political accountability, and the practical implementation of checks and balances. The study also highlights structural limitations in the Parliament’s role as a forum for reconciling internal and external lobbying pressures with broader state interests.
The conclusions underscore the relevance of strengthening parliamentary oversight, enhancing executive accountability, and institutional consideration of mechanisms such as votes of no confidence and impeachment within the framework of current constitutional reforms.
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References
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