Abstract

This study examines the constitutional role of the President in the promulgation of laws, the limits of presidential veto power, and their implications for legislative continuity from a comparative constitutional law perspective. The analysis focuses on Article 75 of the Constitution of the Republic of North Macedonia, which regulates the promulgation procedure and the President’s authority to sign or return legislation.

The research employs a comparative, normative, and functional methodology. The constitutional framework of North Macedonia is examined in light of the constitutional systems of Serbia, an EU candidate country, and Slovenia and Hungary, both EU Member States. The central hypothesis is that, although the Macedonian Constitution does not confer an explicit absolute veto power upon the President, it creates a normative gap by conditioning the entry into force of legislation upon presidential promulgation without providing an effective mechanism to address a refusal to act.

The findings demonstrate that, despite the constitutional obligation of the President to promulgate a law once it has been reconsidered and re-adopted by Parliament, the constitutional framework lacks an institutional safeguard capable of ensuring legislative continuity in the event of presidential non-compliance. As a result, a veto designed to be merely suspensive may, in practice, produce the effects of a continuing veto or a de facto absolute veto. The study further explores the legal implications of presidential inaction, namely situations in which the President neither exercises the veto power nor promulgates the law, creating a form of constitutional silence with uncertain legal consequences.

The article concludes that a constitutional reform combining reasoned veto requirements, constitutional review mechanisms, clear procedural deadlines, and alternative promulgation procedures would strengthen legislative continuity while preserving the constitutional balance between Parliament and the President.