Abstract

This article examines the problem of relativism, which frequently arises in contemporary theoretical interpretations of democracy, from a historical and philosophical perspective. The study argues that the simplistic identification of democracy with relativism and the insufficient consideration of its philosophical foundations distort the internal logic of democracy and weaken its value orientation. The aim of the research is to conceptualise democracy not as a system grounded in unqualified individualism, but as a synthesis of individualism and universalism, while clarifying the place of relativism within the democratic order.
The article analyses the historical evolution of the concepts of equality and freedom through the works of J.-J. Rousseau, T. Hobbes, J. Locke, H. Kelsen, and G. Gurvitch. Equality is interpreted not as a merely quantitative principle, but as a qualitative principle of legal and moral integrity. Democracy is understood as a social order based on the rule of law, and it is argued that political relativism should not be equated with philosophical relativism. Epistemological, moral, and cultural forms of relativism are distinguished, and their impact on democratic institutions is examined.
The study employs the methodology of social constructivism (P. Berger and T. Luckmann) to demonstrate that democracy, law, and freedom are socially constructed meanings shaped through historical and institutional practices rather than self-evident realities. Drawing on a theoretical dialogue with contemporary theories of democracy, including J. Habermas’s deliberative democracy, C. Mouffe’s agonistic democracy, and J. Rawls’s political liberalism, the article explores the complex relationship between democracy and relativism.
In conclusion, democracy is assessed as an open project capable of self-renewal, whose future development depends on the rule of law, social rights, and multi-level processes of democratisation.